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2025 (Current Year) Faculty Courses School of Engineering Department of Industrial Engineering and Economics Graduate major in Industrial Engineering and Economics

Advanced Noncooperative Game Theory

Academic unit or major
Graduate major in Industrial Engineering and Economics
Instructor(s)
Ryo Kawasaki
Class Format
Lecture (Face-to-face)
Media-enhanced courses
-
Day of week/Period
(Classrooms)
3-4 Mon / 3-4 Thu
Class
-
Course Code
IEE.B403
Number of credits
200
Course offered
2025
Offered quarter
2Q
Syllabus updated
Mar 19, 2025
Language
English

Syllabus

Course overview and goals

This course covers the elementary topics in noncooperative game theory. These topics include (1) games in strategic form, dominated strategies, Nash equlibrium; (2) potential games and supermodular games; (3) games in extensive form, subgame-perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; and (4) repeated games; (5) games with incomplete information.

In recent years, game theory has been extensively used in theoretical economics. This course is intended to provide students with knowledge of noncooperative game theory for application to complex economic systems.

Course description and aims

By taking this course, students will have developed the following skills:
1) Build an economic model using advanced noncooperative game theory
2) Calculate Nash equilibria, subgame-perfect equilibria, sequential equilibria, etc. of games given in strategic form and extensive form.
3) Think logically and explain complex social phenomenon using game theory
4) Read theoretical academic papers that use noncooperative game theory.

Keywords

Games in strategic form, Nash equilibrium, potential games, supermodular games, games in extensive form, subgame-perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, trembling-hand perfect equilibrium

Competencies

  • Specialist skills
  • Intercultural skills
  • Communication skills
  • Critical thinking skills
  • Practical and/or problem-solving skills

Class flow

This course will be held in lecture form. If time allows, some exercise problems will be explained.

Course schedule/Objectives

Course schedule Objectives
Class 1 Definition of a strategic form game, dominated strategies Details will be given in each lecture.
Class 2 Iterated removal of dominated strategies
Class 3 Nash equilibrium
Class 4 The proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium
Class 5 Potential games
Class 6 Potential games and improvement paths
Class 7 Supermodular games
Class 8 Definition of games in extensive form (perfect information case)
Class 9 Definition of games in extensive form (general case)
Class 10 Repeated games and the Folk Theorem
Class 11 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
Class 12 Games with incomplete information (1) - Bayesian games, Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Class 13 Games with incomplete information (2) - Applications
Class 14 Review of Lectures 1-14

Study advice (preparation and review)

To enhance effective learning, students are encouraged to spend approximately 100 minutes preparing for class and another 100 minutes reviewing class content afterwards (including assignments) for each class.
They should do so by referring to textbooks and other course material.

Textbook(s)

No textbook. Lecture notes will be uploaded online (T2SCHOLA).

Reference books, course materials, etc.

Vega-Redondo, F. Economics and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Mas-Colell, A., M. Whinston, and J. Green. Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Evaluation methods and criteria

Grades will be based on homework assignments and exercise problems.

Related courses

  • IEE.B401 : Advanced Microeconomics
  • IEE.B402 : Advanced Macroeconomics
  • IEE.B404 : Advanced Cooperative Game Theory
  • IEE.B405 : Advanced Econometrics
  • IEE.B431 : Advanced Topics in Microeconomics

Prerequisites

Knowledge of undergraduate level of game theory is required.