2024 Faculty Courses School of Engineering Undergraduate major in Industrial Engineering and Economics
Cooperative Game Theory
- Academic unit or major
- Undergraduate major in Industrial Engineering and Economics
- Instructor(s)
- Ryo Kawasaki
- Class Format
- Lecture (Face-to-face)
- Media-enhanced courses
- -
- Day of week/Period
(Classrooms) - 1-2 Mon / 1-2 Thu
- Class
- -
- Course Code
- IEE.B302
- Number of credits
- 200
- Course offered
- 2024
- Offered quarter
- 1Q
- Syllabus updated
- Mar 14, 2025
- Language
- Japanese
Syllabus
Course overview and goals
This course covers the elementary concepts of cooperative game theory. The topics include the bargaining problem and the Nash bargaining solution, games in characteristic function form, and applications such as voting games, markets, and topics built off of optimization problems.
The objective of this course is for students to first grasp the basic concepts of cooperative game theory and then apply them to problems in economics and industrial engineering. Ideally, the application of the theory should span to a broader range of situations than was possible by only using noncooperative game theory.
Course description and aims
By completing this course, students will have the necessary tools to do the following:
1) Build an economic model and to apply cooperative game theory.
2) Calculate the Nash bargaining solution, core, nucleolus, and Shapley value in their respective game models.
3) Think and explain phenomenon in a logical manner.
Keywords
Bargaining problem, Nash bargaining solution, games in characteristic function form, core, nucleolus, Shapley value, matching problem
Competencies
- Specialist skills
- Intercultural skills
- Communication skills
- Critical thinking skills
- Practical and/or problem-solving skills
Class flow
This class will be held in lecture form. If time allows, some exercise problems will be explained.
Course schedule/Objectives
| Course schedule | Objectives | |
|---|---|---|
| Class 1 | What is cooperative game theory, and how is it different from noncooperative game theory? | Details will be given in each lecture. |
| Class 2 | The bargaining problem and the Nash bargaining solution | |
| Class 3 | The four axioms of the Nash bargaining solution | |
| Class 4 | Games in characteristic function form and the core | |
| Class 5 | Voting games and the core | |
| Class 6 | The core of markets with indivisible goods | |
| Class 7 | Minimum cost spanning tree games and the core | |
| Class 8 | Definition of the nucleolus | |
| Class 9 | Application of the nucleolus | |
| Class 10 | Definition of the Shapley value and examples | |
| Class 11 | Voting indices | |
| Class 12 | The folk solution for minimum cost spanning tree games | |
| Class 13 | Two-sided matching problem | |
| Class 14 | Problems related to the two-sided matching problem |
Study advice (preparation and review)
To enhance effective learning, students are encouraged to spend approximately 100 minutes preparing for class and another 100 minutes reviewing class content afterwards (including assignments) for each class.
They should do so by referring to textbooks and other course material.
Textbook(s)
No designated textbook. Lecture notes will be distributed online (T2SCHOLA).
Reference books, course materials, etc.
Muto, S. Introduction to Game Theory. Tokyo: Nikkei Publishing Inc., 2001. (Japanese)
Funaki, Y. Exercises in Game Theory. Tokyo: Saiensu-sha Co. Ltd. Publishers, 2004. (Japanese)
Muto, S. Game Theory. Tokyo: Ohmsha, 2011. (Japanese)
Kurino, M. Game Theory and Matching: Tokyo: Nikkei Publishing Inc., 2019. (Japanese)
Evaluation methods and criteria
Grades will be based on short quizzes, homework assignments, and the final exam (to be held in the classroom). How the final exam will be conducted may be subject to change.
Related courses
- IEE.B201 ： Microeconomics I
- IEE.B202 ： Microeconomics II
- IEE.B205 ： Noncooperative Game Theory
- IEE.A201 ： Basic Mathematics for Industrial Engineering and Economics
Prerequisites
No prerequisites.