2021 Faculty Courses School of Engineering Undergraduate major in Industrial Engineering and Economics

Noncooperative Game Theory

Academic unit or major: Undergraduate major in Industrial Engineering and Economics
Instructor(s): Emiko Fukuda
Class Format: Lecture
Media-enhanced courses: -
Day of week/Period (Classrooms): 3-4 Tue (W833) / 3-4 Fri (W833)
Class: -
Course Code: IEE.B205
Number of credits: 200
Course offered: 2021
Offered quarter: 2Q
Syllabus updated: Jul 10, 2025
Language: Japanese

Syllabus

Course overview and goals

This course covers the elementary topics in non-cooperative game theory. These topics include (1) games in strategic form, dominated strategies, Nash equilibrium; (2) games in extensive form and subgame-perfect equilibrium; (3) repeated games and the Folk Theorem; and (4) evolutionary game theory.

In everyday life, people interact with each other. Game theory is a mathematical tool used in analyzing the interaction among rational decision makers. Its applications range throughout many topics in economics and management, and by applying this theory, additional insights may emerge. The objective of this course is for students to be able to apply the theory when examining topics of their interest in economics and industrial engineering.

Course description and aims

By taking this course, students will have attained the following skills:
1) Build an economic model using non-cooperative game theory.
2) Calculate Nash equilibria, subgame-perfect equilibria, etc. of games given in strategic form and extensive form.
3) Think logically and explain social phenomenon using game theory.

Keywords

Games in strategic form, Nash equilibrium, games in extensive form, subgame-perfect equilibrium, Bayesian games, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, evolutionary game theory

Competencies

Specialist skills
Intercultural skills
Communication skills
Critical thinking skills
Practical and/or problem-solving skills

Class flow

This class will be held in lecture form. If time allows, some exercise problems will be explained.

Course schedule/Objectives

	Course schedule	Objectives
Class 1	Games in strategic form (1) - Definition of a game, game in (bi)matrix form, dominated strategies	Details will be given in each lecture.
Class 2	Games in strategic form (2) - Zero-sum games, maximin strategies, minimax strategies, Minimax Theorem
Class 3	Games in strategic form (3) - Rationalizable strategies, best response, Nash equilibrium
Class 4	Games in strategic form (4) - Review, applications
Class 5	Games in extensive form (1) - Game tree, information set, strategy
Class 6	Games in extensive form (2) - Subgame, Subgame-perfect equilibrium, games with perfect information, backwards induction
Class 7	Games in extensive form (3) - Applications, games with imperfect information
Class 8	Review of Lectures 1-7, midterm evaluation
Class 9	Repeated games (1) - Finitely repeated games, component games, strategies in repeated games
Class 10	Repeated games (2) - Infinitely repeated games, Folk Theorem
Class 11	Games with incomplete information (1) - Incomplete information, Bayesian games, types, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
Class 12	Games with incomplete information (2) - Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, belief, consistency, sequential rationality
Class 13	Games with incomplete information (3) - Adverse selection, signaling, screening
Class 14	Evolutionary game theory - Basic concepts, evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), applications

Study advice (preparation and review)

To enhance effective learning, students are encouraged to spend approximately 100 minutes preparing for class and another 100 minutes reviewing class content afterwards (including assignments) for each class.
They should do so by referring to textbooks and other course material.

Textbook(s)

Muto, S. Introduction to Game Theory. Tokyo: Nikkei Publishing Inc., 2001. (Japanese)

Reference books, course materials, etc.

Funaki, Y. Exercises in Game Theory. Tokyo: Saiensu-sha Co. Ltd. Publishers, 2004. (Japanese)
Muto, S. Game Theory. Tokyo: Ohmsha, 2011. (Japanese)
Greve, T. Non-Cooperative Game Theory. Tokyo: Chisen-shokan, 2011. (Japanese)

Evaluation methods and criteria

Homework (approximately 30%), Midterm evaluation and Final exam (approximately 35% each).

Related courses

IEE.B201 ： Microeconomics I
IEE.B202 ： Microeconomics II
IEE.B206 ： Experimental Economics
IEE.B302 ： Cooperative Game Theory
IEE.A201 ： Basic Mathematics for Industrial Engineering and Economics

Prerequisites

No prerequisites.